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This paper comments and assesses “Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: 
Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures”, a paper that David Victor presented at 
the international workshop on "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate 
Change in the Post-Kyoto World", organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy 
School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor’s proposals for an effective climate 
agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses 
have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and 
institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change 
control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of 
climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the 
effectiveness of measures designed to address  the climate change problem. 
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Incentives and Institutions.  





1. Incentives and institutions. These are the two cornerstones of David Victor’s 
analysis. Incentives and institutions have often been neglected in the study of climate 
policy, which mostly focused on concepts like optimality or cost effectiveness. Most 
economic analyses of climate policies have indeed focused on a global target and on the 
optimal or cost effective way to achieve it, but they largely neglected the incentives for 
negotiating countries to agree on the target, disregarded the policy instruments that can 
provide these incentives, and did not pay adequate attention to the institutions that are 
necessary to implement the policy instruments and enforce the target. 
 
The paper by David Victor fills this gap. It carefully analyses both incentives and 
institutions, first in relation to the Kyoto Protocol, then to identify some features of an 
alternative policy architecture. As for the Kyoto Protocol, Victor emphasizes the 
weakness of international institutions that should implement the Protocol rules and 
achieve the Protocol targets. He correctly criticizes the Protocol’s objective of achieving 
universal participation, its focus on binding targets, and the lack of effective measures 
to get developing countries involved in the cooperative effort to control climate change. 
 
However, the main contribution of David Victor’s paper is not his analysis of the Kyoto 
Protocol. His main lesson is that the design of any future agreement on climate policy 
must start from analyzing each country’s incentives to participate in the agreement, and 
then move to identify policy instruments and institutions that provide adequate 
incentives to reluctant countries.
† 
 
                                                 
*Paper presented at the workshop "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in 
the Post-Kyoto World", J.F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, May 12-13, 2006. The author is 
grateful to Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins for helpful suggestions and remarks. The usual disclaimer applies. 
† This point is not new – see for example Chapter 11 in IPCC TAR (2001) – but is not yet adequately 
considered in many policy analyses and in actual policymaking.   
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He draws this lesson from a careful analysis of recent events in international climate 
negotiations and domestic policymaking. His main conclusions are not new. Similar 
results have been achieved in the recent theoretical literature on international 
environmental agreements (Cf. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; See Carraro 
and Marchiori, 2003 for a survey). However, rather than using a general and sometimes 
unrealistic game-theoretic framework, Victor develops his arguments by looking at the 
reality of existing policy institutions and markets. From this viewpoint his analysis his 
novel, well rooted and more convincing than previous ones. In addition, many features 
of the new policy architecture that he proposes are also interesting and original. 
 
Nevertheless, to understand the importance and the robustness of David Victor’s 
analysis, let me first summarize the main motivations and results of the game-theoretic 
literature. This would also help highlighting similarities and differences between 
theoretical works and David Victor’s contribution. 
 
 
2. Among the transnational policy issues, environmental protection is a limiting case. 
In areas such as global warming, ozone layer depletion and biodiversity, spillovers, as 
well as the absence of clear property rights, create strong incentives to free ride which 
undermine co-operation. Hence, the difficulty of reaching agreements which are both 
effective and widely accepted. 
 
The above problems are not new to economists, and have been analyzed in the area of 
externalities and public goods. What is new is the context in which these problems take 
place. Currently, climate change control is managed as a global common-property good, 
but there is no institution which possesses powers to regulate it by means of supra-
national legislation, economic instruments, or by imposing a system of global property 
rights. Hence, the necessity to design negotiation mechanisms leading to self-enforcing 
agreements, i.e. agreements to control climate change which are voluntarily signed by a 
“large” group of countries (large enough to keep climate change under control).  
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Economists are quite skeptical about the possibility of achieving self-enforcing 
agreements on climate change. Early contributions (Cf. Hardin and Baden, 1977) would 
have characterized the climate control game among countries as a prisoner’s dilemma, 
inevitably leading to the so-called "tragedy" of the common property goods. But in the 
real world, a large number of international environmental agreements on the commons 
have been signed, often involving sub groups of negotiating countries and sometimes 
involving transfers and links to other policies (trade, technological cooperation, etc.). 
This is why the “prisoner’s dilemma” approach is unsatisfactory and new conceptual 
models have been developed, which proved more helpful in understanding the logic of 
international cooperation in the presence of positive spillovers. These new models were 
developed in the last decade within a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, and 
provide interesting indications on the likely outcomes of climate negotiations (Cf. 
Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003 for surveys of the literature). 
 
 
3. The main results of the game-theoretic literature can be summarized as follows.  
•  The presence of asymmetries across countries and the incentive to free-ride 
make the existence of global self-enforcing agreements, i.e. agreements which 
are profitable to all countries and stable, quite unlikely (Carraro and Siniscalco, 
1993; Barrett, 1994).  
•  When self-enforcing international environmental agreements exist, they are 
signed by a limited number of countries (Hoel, 1992, 1994; Barrett, 1994).  
•  When the number of signatories is large, the difference between the cooperative 
behavior adopted by the group of signatories and the non co-operative one is 
very small (Barrett, 1997).  
•  The grand coalition, in which all countries sign the same environmental 
agreement, is unlikely to be an equilibrium (Finus and Rundshagen, 2003).  
  5
•  The equilibrium coalition structure is not formed by a single coalition (a single 
group of signatories). In general, more than one coalition forms at the 
equilibrium (Bloch, 1997; Yi, 1997).  
•  Coalitions of different sizes may emerge at the equilibrium, even when countries 
are symmetric (Ray and Vohra, 1997; Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Yi, 1997). 
‡ 
 
The lesson that can be drawn from these results can be phrased as follows. A global 
agreement is unlikely to be signed by all the relevant countries. Several parallel 
agreements are going to emerge over time. Domestic measures and/or policies 
implemented by small groups of countries are going to be adopted to control climate 
change.  
 
These predictions are consistent with David Victor’s ones. For example, he writes: “The 
integrated international market for emissions … has not yet materialized; instead at least 
six different carbon markets have emerged”, and “Too much attention has focused on 
global institutions and not enough on the more diverse national and regional bodies”. 
For the future, he sees: “An extensive use of nonbinding agreements among smaller 
groups of countries and allowance for fragmented emission trading systems”. And also: 
“The future landscape will be dominated by multiple (permit) prices”. 
 
Similarly to Victor, several authors working within a game-theoretic framework have 
used their results to question the design of the Kyoto Protocol (Cf. Carraro, 1998; 
Bloch, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003; Yi, 2003; Bretteville et al., 2004; Buchner 
and Carraro, 2006). They argue that the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to be signed by all 
relevant players and that the emergence of alternative, parallel climate blocs is likely.  
Some indications that multiple regional or sub-global climate blocs could be the 
                                                 
‡ The specific results on the size of the coalitions depend on the model structure and in particular on the 
slope of countries’ reaction functions, i.e. on the presence of leakage. If there is no leakage and countries 
are symmetric, then the Nash equilibrium of the multi-coalition game is characterized by many small 
coalitions, each one satisfying the properties of internal and external stability (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 
2003).  
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appropriate way to address the difficulties emerging in climate negotiations can also be 
found in the political science literature (see for example, Egenhofer and Legge, 2001; 
Egenhofer, Hager and Legge, 2001; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Reinstein, 2004; Carraro 
and Egenhofer, 2006).  
 
The basic idea in all these contributions is that a bottom-up, country-driven approach to 
defining national commitments should be adopted. Instead of top-down, global 
negotiations on national emission targets, each country or group of countries would 
determine its contribution to a cooperative effort to curb GHGs and choose the partners 
with whom it intends to cooperate. In a process analogous to trade negotiations, each 
country would put its offer of commitments on the negotiating table and invite 
proposals from other countries for similar commitments. 
 
 
4. A fragmented climate regime characterized by the formation of climate blocs 
(regional coalitions for example) would then emerge in  much the same way as is now 
emerging in trade negotiations. This should not be surprising. As Victors correctly says, 
in substance, even though not in form, the Kyoto Protocol already reflects agreements 
among several different coalitions. It incorporates special provisions for several 
different groups of countries. The Non-Annex B countries have no commitments and 
can benefit from emission reduction investments through the CDM. The most 
vulnerable Non-Annex B countries can also receive financial assistance for adaptation 
from the levy imposed on the CDM (and possibly on the other mechanisms). The 
European Union has the ability under Article 4 to redistribute the emissions reduction 




                                                 
§ As  has been stressed by Egenhofer and Legge (2001), “it is increasingly becoming clear, [that] the 
Kyoto Protocol is less a global agreement than a set of differing regional approaches”.  
  7
In addition, the lesson that can be derived from trade negotiations consistently tells us 
that progress on trade liberalization can be achieved mostly through regional 
agreements, at least in the coming years.
** In international trade, the “resurgence” of 
regionalism has thus become a crucial subject, underscored  by the formation of 
competing customs unions and the debate about free trade areas. Substantial attention 
has been focused on the efficiency and implications of these regional or sub-global co-
operations (Cf. Baldwin, 1993; Casella, 1995; Bloch and Ferrer, 1999; Bond and 
Syropoulos, 1996; Krugman, 1991; Yi, 1996a, 1996b and 1998).  
 
In particular, several authors have pointed out  that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
may seem to be contradictory, but they can often actually support the WTO’s 
multilateral trading system (Cf. Sampson and Woolcock, 2003). Regional agreements 
have allowed groups of countries to negotiate rules and commitments that go beyond 
what was previously possible multilaterally. In turn, some of these rules have paved the 
way for agreements within the WTO. Services, intellectual property, environmental 
standards, investment and competition policies are all issues that were raised in regional 
negotiations and later developed into agreements or topics of discussion in the WTO.
†† 
For these reasons, on 6 February 1996, the WTO General Council created the Regional 
Trade Agreements Committee. Its purpose is to examine regional groups and to assess 
                                                 
**  The strong increase in the number of trade bloc agreements registered with the World Trade 
Organisation is discussed in Tjornhom (2000) and Boonekamp (2003). Some 250 regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2002, of which 130 were 
notified after January 1995. About 200 RTAs are currently in force. An additional 70 to 100 are estimated 
to be operational although not yet notified. RTAs, which includes bilateral free trade agreements between 
countries that are not in the same region, have become so widespread that all but one WTO member are 
now parties to one or more of them. Indeed, as of August 2006, all 146 WTO Members, with the 
exception of Mongolia, participate in or are actively negotiating regional trade agreements. 
†† The groupings that are important for the WTO are those that abolish or reduce barriers to trade within 
the group. The WTO agreements recognize that regional arrangements and closer economic integration 
can benefit countries. It also recognizes that under some circumstances regional trading arrangements 
could hurt the trade interests of other countries. Normally, setting up a customs union or free trade area 
would violate the WTO’s principle of equal treatment for all trading partners (“most-favoured-nation”). 
But GATT’s Article 24 allows regional trading arrangements to be set up as a special exception, provided 
certain strict criteria are met. In particular, the arrangements should help trade flow more freely among 
the countries in the group without barriers being raised on trade with the outside world. In other words, 
regional integration should complement the multilateral trading system and not threaten it.  
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whether they are consistent with WTO rules. The committee is also examining how 
regional arrangements might affect the multilateral trading system, and what the 
relationship between regional and multilateral arrangements might be. 
 
A similar process may be envisaged for the case of climate change control. Some 
domestic or regional initiatives to reduce GHG emissions today may pave the way to a 
global agreement tomorrow. 
 
The parallelism with trade negotiations is used also by David Victor to claim that a new 
policy architecture, no longer based on binding agreements and on a global target, 
would be more effective in reducing global GHG emissions.  
 
 
5. The basic ingredients of the policy architecture would be: 
 
-  The coordination of a variety of efforts. Countries would agree on things to do 
rather than on emission reduction targets. 
-  A variable geometry of participation. Some countries would agree on more 
efforts than others. 
-  A sufficient accountability system to ensure that commitments become 
connected to action. 
 
How can this be achieved? David Victor does not neglect the negotiation process and 
the related institutions. He emphasizes how more and better cooperation on GHG 
emission control could be achieved by limiting the number of negotiating countries to 
the most important ones (e.g. the 20 top polluters). He also highlights the importance of 
issue linkage and transfers (through economic cooperation). And the necessity of a 
mechanism for review and scrutiny. 
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Again all this is not completely new. There is, for example, a large literature on both 
issue linkage and transfers (among many others, two recent contributions are Buchner et 
al., 2005, and Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus, 2006) that highlights under what 
conditions these mechanisms can enhance participation incentives and lead more 
countries to agree on GHG emission abatement. 
 
What is new in David Victor’s paper is the careful analysis of what these mechanism 
could be in practice. For example, how can scrutiny be designed or where economic 
cooperation can effectively reduce GHG emissions (e.g. by building natural gas 
infrastructures in China). What David Victor does is to give substance and realism to 
ideas and results that were developed via mathematical models and therefore were 
unable to deal with the details of the actual policy process. We have seen that the 
theoretical economic literature supports David Victor’s analysis. But the other way 
around is also true. David Victor’s gives meaning and appeal to the theoretical results. 
 
It is also important to stress the relevance that Victor gives to the role of institutions. A 
bottom up approach is to be favored not only because the underlying participation 
incentives inevitably leads to a fragmented climate policy regime, but also because the 
institutions which are capable to implement an effective climate policy do not yet exist 
at the international level, but sometimes exist at the domestic and regional level. 
Therefore, a club approach, in which cooperation takes place on specific dimensions 
where (a few) participating countries have institutions that guarantee compliance and 
effectiveness, becomes the appropriate one. 
 
 
6. Three elements of David Victor’s proposal deserve additional scrutiny. It is clear 
that in terms of incentives and institutions a bottom-up approach is the only one with 
chances to succeed in curbing GHG emissions. A set of coordinated efforts with a 
variable participation geometry is likely to be the future of climate policy. However, by 
relying only on self-interests, this approach may not succeed in achieving the large  
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emission reductions that most scientists believe to be necessary to control climate 
change. Is there a way of assessing the amount of emission reduction that a bottom up 
approach is likely to achieve in the next fifty years? 
  
A second elements concerns equity and burden sharing. If countries agree on different 
sets of efforts, how can the costs of these efforts be assessed and compared? For 
example, is there a way to claim that the effort to develop new energy technologies (e.g. 
in the US) is larger or costs more than the effort to replace coal power plants (e.g. in 
Germany or China) or the effort to accept higher temperatures at home and at work in 
the summer (as recently suggested by the Japanese Minister of the Environment)? Is 
there a metric of efforts? 
 
Finally, David Victor’s policy architecture does not mention adaptation. Adaptation, 
whatever we do to reduce GHG emissions and whatever the anthropic influence on 
climate change, will be needed. The related large investments are likely to crowd out 
other investments, including those to reduce emissions. Is there a link between 
mitigation and adaptation in David Victor’s proposal? Can the set of coordinated efforts 
proposed by Victor also include the effort to adapt to climate change? Given the 
policymakers’ discount rate, the costs of adaptation (to be paid far in the future) is likely 
to be smaller than the costs of mitigation (to be paid in the coming years), unless some 
catastrophic impacts of climate change are expected. Does this mean that a coordination 
of efforts to adapt our economic systems and lifestyles to climate change will crowd out 
most efforts to reduce GHG emissions? 
 
These three questions are relevant for all policy architectures and not only for the one 
proposed by Victor. The answer to these questions is a necessary complement to all 
policy proposals on GHG mitigation. And the three questions are strictly interlinked. 
For example, if countries’ incentives and institutions lead to a set of regional or sub 
global agreements that are unable to provide a sufficient amount of emission abatement, 
than more adaptation efforts would be necessary. Are there incentives and institutions to  
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provide the right amount of adaptation investments? As another example, it is well 
known that some countries are more vulnerable than others to climate change. How can 
the costs of adapting to climate change be distributed  in a fair and acceptable way 
among world countries? Is an adaptation fund the appropriate answer to this question? 
How should contributions to the adaptation fund be designed? 
 
 
7. Conclusions. Let me conclude by summarising my own version of David Victor’s 
policy architecture (which is also my own favoured policy architecture). Let me start 
from the number of negotiating countries: as recently proposed by the Canadian Prime 
Minister, twenty is probably the right number, but a slightly smaller number would also 
be appropriate. Then, the issues on which these countries will negotiate have to be 
defined. Technological cooperation, climate relate trade rules, carbon taxation, carbon 
sinks, contribution to a global adaptation fund, forestry preservation, biofuels, 
development aid, energy infrastructures, are some examples. For each issue a number of 
countries, not necessarily the same countries, not necessarily the same number, decide 
to cooperate. This decision implies both that some measures are adopted in each country 
(or small group of countries) to achieve a common issue-specific objective, and that a 
system of monitoring and enforcement is established amongst the signatory countries. A 
regular verification process of how different measures are implemented in each country 
or group of countries (and of their impacts and costs) can also be agreed upon. Regular 
meetings can be organised to update the set of countries cooperating on each issue. 
Whenever the verification process identifies an insufficient effectiveness of the adopted 
measures or an unequal sharing of the burden of controlling climate change, new 
measures or a new distribution of existing measures have to be negotiated. Given that 
all measures are implemented domestically or within a bilateral or regional cooperative 
setting (e.g. the European Union or Mercosur), the establishment of new global or 
supra-national institutions would not be necessary. 
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This framework implies that climate change is no longer an environmental problem to 
be dealt with specific environmental policy measures. It is a global economic problem 
to be dealt with global economic policy measures. Whatever the issue that world leaders 
are going to analyse and discuss, climate change should be a dimension of their own 
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